

VALUES ADDED: SOME SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF VALUES EDUCATION

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SYNOPSIS

In its quest for efficiency gains, the Conservative government since 1979 increasingly framed education policy within the metaphor of a market; or, more precisely, within that of a quasi-market (Glennister, 1991). To this end, parents have been re-defined as consumers who will seek an effective school. In order to help them, the government has published allegedly objective measures of the effectiveness of schools, largely in the form of league tables. Of late it has added values education to its previous concern about value-added measures of attainment. Alongside the search for value for money comes the search for a set of fundamental values which will shore up an increasingly fragmented social order. In other words the question now turns on which values and dispositions can be 'given' to children and young people so that they may go on to play their part in the economy and to have a sense of belonging in society. The very prominence of current concerns about values education is by no means unconnected to the development of individualism, consumerism and value-added thinking which the economic policies of the previous government had sought to further.

INTRODUCTION

The argument will be as follows. First, I refer to recent curricular developments both in Scotland and in England which have emphasised the need for values education. The concerns raised in England by the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) have received far more publicity than the deliberations by the Scottish Consultative Council on the Curriculum (SCCC). And the SCAA is, by definition, an *authority*, unlike the SCCC, which is but a *council*. Even so, the issues for Scotland and England are not much different, as their documentation reveals. Secondly, I suggest that the academic focus which has been brought to bear on values education has been mainly psychological and philosophical, especially the latter. Again, this situation prevails in both systems, and I shall allude very briefly to some of the more important work being done. Third — and this will be the central theme — I locate values education within a sociological framework, so as to broaden the disciplinary focus upon it. In other words, it will not be the purpose here to dwell upon the philosophical or theological questions about which values transcend time, place and custom, and which do not; it is not to dwell on the cognitive processes whereby the individual's capacity for making value-judgements is realised; nor is it to take a 'values education' position, arguing the balance about the best curricular 'mix' of the liberal and the vocational subjects which would transmit values; nor is it to take a values-in-education position on which school ethos or climate can best transmit implicitly whatever value-consensus exists (if it exists); and nor is it to focus wholly on a Scottish or any other national stance on the matter. It is none of these. The central purpose here is to consider the 'nature' of the social which has given rise to the current concerns about values education in contemporary industrial societies. It is, therefore, a sociological issue. I shall introduce some of the prominent social theorists of late modernity who may inform our thinking about values education: Stephan Mestrovic and Anthony Giddens, who draw on a Durkheimian heritage; and Zygmunt Bauman, Alberto Melucci, Philip Wexler,

Scott Lash and Marshall Berman, whose work is within the critical theory tradition. I suggest that, viewed sociologically, the current approach to values education is broadly functionalist (and conservative) in its direction, for it fails to come to terms with aspects of the deep structure of contemporary society, namely its consumerism and profound social inequalities.

THE MORAL DISORDER

Morality is privatised, relativistic suspicion becomes the standard response to any talk about moral standards and it is found uncomfortable, even embarrassing, to discuss morality in public. [...] In fact, this beatification of individual autonomy is a chimera (Dr George Carey, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1997, p. 3).

In England, this theme — and its implications for education — has been the subject of well-publicised conferences and meetings arranged during 1996 by SCAA. Indeed at a conference held in July 1996 it was decided to form a National Forum for School and Community Values (SCAA, 1996c). Earlier, in January, SCAA's 'Education for Adult Life' conference had contained important statements by Sir Ron Dearing and by Dr Nicholas Tate, the chief executive of SCAA. Their theme is much the same as that of Dr Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury. Take Dearing:

The invisible bonds to which I refer are the bonds that came naturally in a much more stable society than we have today. They came from families of grandparents, parents, uncles and aunts, who often lived their lives in one town; from neighbours who lived in the same street for long years; from the doctor, the parson, headteacher and teacher, the postman, the policeman, and, yes, the milkman too, for being long part of one community and being known, liked and respected, and by their lives, setting standards, in particular, for young people. By contrast today, we are a highly mobile society. Those tent-pegs of my childhood have largely gone, especially in our cities. At the same time, the gradual erosion of the Christian religion, the decline of Sunday School as part of a child's Sunday, and the values they stood for, have further loosened the code that our society is based upon (SCAA, 1996b, unpaginated).

And Tate:

By relativism I mean the view that morality is largely a matter of taste or opinion, that there is no such thing as moral error, and that there is no point therefore in searching for the truth about moral matters or in arguing and reasoning about it (SCAA, 1996b; unpaginated).

What are said to be the causes of all this? In the publication *Education for Adult Life*, a report of its conference held in January 1996, SCAA lists the *possible causes* as follows: first, 'dominant intellectual currents', which express tolerance and 'respect for beliefs and lifestyles'; second, 'loss of moral discernment'; third, 'loss of respect for national leaders, both temporal and spiritual'; fourth, 'materialism and greed'; fifth, the 'fragmentation of the family and the collapse of historic communities', which 'was ascribed to marriage breakdown, social and geographical mobility, unemployment and poverty, changes in communications and the influence of international mass media'; sixth, 'technological developments'; and seventh, 'lack of a common language', particularly the distinctions to be drawn between 'moral', 'moral development', 'values' and 'attitudes' (SCAA, 1996d, pp. 8–9). In October 1996 SCAA launched a consultation exercise on the values statement which had been drawn up earlier in

the year by The National Forum for Values in Education and the Community. SCAA later reported in December 1996 on the survey conducted by the polling organisation MORI, a survey which was to discover the degree of agreement on the values statements. Respondents were drawn from the general public, parents, schools (headteachers and heads of personal and social education programmes), governors and key organisations. The values statements were categorised thus: 'society'; 'relationships'; 'self'; and 'environment'. Tate reported:

The consultation aimed to discover whether there is a consensus in society on what our core moral values are. The quantitative findings show that there is in fact a very strong agreement across all ages and social classes, and an especially strong agreement in schools themselves. Schools can now be certain that, in moral education based upon this framework of values, they are strongly supported by society in general (SCAA, 1996e)

But there appears to be a serious omission: no children were asked; and the responses from 'schools' were overwhelmingly those of head teachers — eighty-two per cent of 'school responses' were returned by them. This is hardly evidence of 'especially strong agreement in schools themselves'. Curiously, in a speech on January 15th, 1996 Tate had cited another MORI poll conducted in 1994 which seems to *question the very existence of a consensus* on core moral values which the later 1996 MORI poll reported. He said: 'A Mori poll in 1994 showed that 48% of 15–35 year olds did not believe that there were definite rights and wrongs in life, while 41% felt that morality always (not just sometimes) depended on the circumstances' (SCAA, 1996a). So, having earlier in 1996 used the 1994 MORI poll to justify giving prominence to the problem of moral relativism in society, within the space of a year SCAA then uses the 1996 MORI poll to state that there is, after all, 'a consensus in society on what our core moral values are'. The implication made by SCAA is that all which now remains to be done is to decide upon the best way to transmit the agreed values to children.

The documentation produced by both the national quangos are much of a piece. (The SCCC have, however, published a series of occasional papers on values education which 'are not necessarily the views of Scottish CCC'. See, for example, Carr (1995), Eisner (1994) and McGettrick (1996).) The SCCC's own *The Heart of the Matter: education for personal and social development* (SCCC, 1995a) has a format not dissimilar to a glossy corporate prospectus, expensively produced, with highly irregular paragraph indentations and colour-coded backgrounds. But beneath the designer dressing rests — as the title implies — the 'heart of the matter'. It is unclear whether or not the postmodern ambiguity in the title was intended: the heart (implying feelings) and the heart (implying the core). On a first reflection, there is perhaps a hint of the former, given that an earlier SCCC paper had been entitled *More Than Feelings of Concern* (SCCC, 1986). But this appears not to be the case, for the emphasis is very much on constructing a 'sound foundation':

But education is not a commodity, a collection of qualifications acquired as a means to a future end. [...] The imperative is to provide young people with a sound foundation on which to base moral and ethical decisions and behaviour which respect the dignity of themselves and others and the nature of the inter-dependent world in which we live. This is the heart of the matter. This is education for personal and social development (SCCC, 1995a, p. 1)

There is a close correspondence between SCAA's categorisation of its 'values statements', as contained in the 1996 MORI poll (namely, 'society'; 'relationships'; 'self'; and 'environment'), and the SCCC's 1995 categorisation contained in the

Heart of the Matter (namely, 'self', 'relationships', 'rights and responsibilities', and 'work') (SCCC, 1995:7). The SOED's *National Guidelines for Personal and Social Development 5–14* (SOED, 1993) argues that 'Personal and social development is a fundamental aspect of the education of the whole child. It is essentially concerned with the development of life skills (SOED, 1993, p. 1, bold type in the original). Whereas the tenor of the SCCC documentation is discursive (as befits a discussion document), that of the Guidelines is more prescriptive. But the central point is that here is emerging what has been called the instrumentalisation of the expressive order of the school (Hartley, 1986). That is to say, for much of this century 'values education' has been implicit. It has been transmitted through the hidden curriculum; or, as is fashionable to say, through the school 'ethos'; or, again, through the 'climate'. In Scotland, the trend to formalise personal and social development emerged with the publication of the *Action Plan* (SED, 1983), and, in a more sophisticated form, with *Social Education in Scotland* (CCC, 1986).

In its essence, all this is a form of risk management: first, as I shall argue, we live in an age of fleeting identities, of existential uncertainty; and second, the uncertainties extend to that of national identity and to what counts as morality. And beyond the realm of government a growing 'values education' movement gathers momentum, an indication of which is the series of high-profile conferences referred to earlier. Outside the SCCC there have been contributions from academics in Scotland (Carr, 1995; Standish, 1995). So far, the focus of this approach in Scotland has been decidedly philosophical, and it has been complemented by the Victor Cook lectures given in St Andrews by Pring and by Warnock (Haldane, 1994). However, both Jonathan (1995) and Halliday (1996) — though very much philosophers of education — have also situated their philosophical considerations of values more fully within social and political theory. Some of the work in Scotland (Rodger, 1991; Robb, 1991, 1994) has been enabled financially by the Gordon Cook Foundation, based in Aberdeen. In England, too, there is a corresponding body of literature emerging, again mainly philosophical (Best, 1996; Halstead and Taylor, 1996; Haydon, 1993; Pring, 1996). Taylor (1994), also funded by the Gordon Cook Foundation, has even produced a compendium of the values-education 'network'. Furthermore, a new Scottish-based journal, *The Journal of Values Education*, has just been announced, whose first issue was scheduled for October, 1997. In sum, values education is emerging as both an academic issue and a political issue. What sociological insights can be brought to bear on it?

FRAGMENTED LIVES

Contemporary culture appears to be paradoxical. By definition, the term culture implies a shared way of seeing the world, and of acting accordingly. But what marks contemporary culture — sometimes referred to as the culture of postmodernism — is that it reveals the differences between individuals, not their sense of belonging to each other; not their community. A number of social theorists have commented on this. Take Alberto Melucci. In his *Nomads of the Present*, he states: 'The right to *equality*, under whose banner all modern revolutions have been fought [...] is being replaced by the right to *difference*' (Melucci, 1989, p. 177, italics in the original). Gellner strikes a similar chord:

Postmodernism would seem to be rather clearly in favour of relativism, in as far as it is capable of clarity, and hostile to the idea of unique, exclusive, objective, external or transcendent truth. Truth is elusive, polymorphous, inward, subjective [...]. (Gellner, 1992, p. 24).

Not only is contemporary society a 'risk society', a society of manufactured uncertainty' — mad-cow disease is a case in point — (Beck *et al.*, 1994), it is also one of existential uncertainty (Giddens, 1991), as Melucci elaborates: 'The constitutive dimensions of the self — time and space, health and sickness, sex and age, birth and death, reproduction and love — *are no longer a datum but a problem*' (Melucci, 1996, p. 2; emphasis added). To re-state the paradox: '[...] the concept of postmodern culture is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron. [...] Postmodernity, in other words, is a *post-cultural condition*' (Bauman, 1988, p. 798, italics in the original). That is to say, the notion of a culture implies a shared way of seeing the world, but, paradoxically, what we now seem to share socially is that we are different individuals. But it would be wrong simply to dwell on the term 'differences' within contemporary society: these differences contain profound inequalities, and because the inequalities are interpreted as mere differences they can therefore be perceived as 'just' aesthetic issues, not ethical ones. Viewed thus, the down-and-outs and the dispossessed can be regarded as spectacles. As seen from a politics-of-choice position, they have simply 'chosen' their *life-style*. Meanwhile their materially 'contented' counterparts can sequester themselves in the gated residential zones of safe suburbia (Galbraith, 1992).

We have been in a similar situation before. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim was well aware of the disintegrating tendencies within modern society. His *Moral Education*, which comprised eighteen of twenty lectures which he first gave at the Sorbonne in 1902, was a call for schooling to provide the moral cement which would bind society together as it became more secular. Schools were, he said, to be 'museums of virtue'; the teacher, to be the 'secular priest':

If then, with the exception of the family, there is no collective life in which we participate, if in all the forms of human activity — scientific, artistic, professional, and so on — in other words, in all that constitutes the core of our existence, we are in the habit of acting like lone wolves, our social temperament has only rare opportunities to strengthen and develop itself (Durkheim, 1973[1902], pp. 233–234).

It was the school, not the church, which would fill the moral void between the family and the state.

In the post-war period, a number of important sociological analyses have pointed up the contemporary trend towards increasing individualism. Reisman *et al.*'s (1950) *The Lonely Crowd*, Berger *et al.*'s (1973) *The Homeless Mind* and Lasch's (1980) *The Culture of Narcissism* all provide important insights. But individualism and the rational mode of understanding have limits. There are signs that some people are again seeking a sense of belonging, and that they are returning to their senses. Indeed, prominent social theorists are calling for a revival of collective rituals and practices (Bell, 1990; and Mestrovic, 1991, 1994; Soedjatmoko, 1994). For Bell, bourgeois culture is collapsing; few taboos remain (Bell, 1990, p. 69). In a critique of the implicit relativism in postmodernist epistemology, Mestrovic asks:

Postmodern philosophies purport to rebel against these narratives of constraint, but they fail to address the question of what will replace the constraints (Mestrovic, 1991, p. 164).

Soedjatmoko (1994, p. 488) argues that an individualistic and secularised society assigns little value to sharing, rectitude, inner peace, and harmony with nature. This is not to argue that individualism has been unimportant; on the contrary, it has helped to release much creative power, but now that power has begun to corrode the social fabric. Giddens points up a further paradox to that provided by Bauman, arguing that neo-liberalism has few connections to tradition, with individualism

being given free rein by the market. But — and this is the paradox — unless individualism is balanced by more traditional forms of social solidarity based on nationhood, gender, religion and the family, then the writ of the market cannot run (Giddens, 1995, p. 9).

In order to restore social cohesion appeals are made to integrating rituals and practices. Even within the Conservative party there are to be found those who distance themselves from economic liberalism and who espouse the traditional integrating rituals which associate with the monarchy, patriarchy, the established church, and nationhood. What neo-Durkheimian theorists are arguing is that society must find a way of rendering us as social in the face of these fracturing forces unleashed by market economics. For Durkheim, the school would have undertaken this task; for Bell, there is something to be said for a revival of religious practices; for Giddens, the ‘individual no longer lives primarily by extrinsic moral precepts but by means of the reflexive organisation of the self’ (Giddens, 1991, p. 153). Here Giddens is implying that we all share — in what he refers to as de-traditionalised societies — a practice called reflexivity, an introspection, an evaluation of possibilities for personhood. Although they agree that what has hitherto counted as the social is in jeopardy, they do not agree on what to do about it. Can there be a back-to-basics when the market forever seeks to unsituate us so that we will seek to re-make ourselves, at a price? Can we simply come up with a list of desirable values, ready for test-transmission in the schools, when all around us the advertising media mix reality and virtuality, reason and emotion? After the age of certainty has been disrupted by market economics and by liberal philosophy, where lies the moral Archimedean point?

THE DE-SOCIALISATION OF SOCIETY

We have dealt briefly with a neo-Durkheimian analysis of contemporary culture. Whilst adherents to this position correctly assert the trend towards what Bell has called ‘odious individualism’ — and are deeply concerned about it — they nevertheless see it as the inevitable consequence of ‘post-industrial society’, again to use Bell’s term. Critical theorists also have the same concerns, but they would question the efficacy of merely calling for some kind of re-moralisation of society, or for what some educationists and religious leaders might term values education. Their reasons are as follows.

Like Melucci, Berman (1983, p. 35) has pointed up the dilemmas and uncertainties of modern life: that between seeking certainty and risking the unknown; that between individualism and the search for community and shared rituals; or that between a moral foundation and a desire to take life to the limit. But, he goes on, contemporary capitalism, far from needing to suppress these uncertainties and dilemmas, needs them. Berman’s book is *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*, a title taken from the Communist Manifesto.

Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. *All that is solid melts into air*, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind (Marx *quoted in* McLellan, 1977, p. 224; italics added):

So, Berman would ask, could contemporary culture be otherwise, given the logic of capitalism? Although both the ‘traditional’ masses and elites have sought

stability, if ever that were to be achieved, then capitalism would not be able to function: 'To say that our society is falling apart is only to say that it is alive and well' (Berman, 1983:95). Like it or not, uncertainty is functional for capitalism. Capitalism produces and *needs* crisis and chaos: '[...] given the bourgeois capacity to make destruction and chaos pay, there is no apparent reason why these crises can't spiral on endlessly, smashing people, families, corporations, towns, but leaving the structures of bourgeois social and power intact' (Berman, 1983, p. 103).

Consider this critical theory in relation to schools. Much is made these days about school ethos, or school climate. Eisner's (1994) *Ethos and Education*, published by the SCCC, interprets the word ethos thus:

Ethos for me is a term that refers to the underlying deep structure of a culture, the values that animate it, that collectively constitute its way of life (Eisner, 1994, two).

He is referring to societal ethos, or to culture. Management pundits, however, have co-opted this term to refer to the ethos of a school. (The 'ethos' approach itself derives much from the 'climate' approach which came and went in the '60s [Halpin and Croft, 1963], and which has its theoretical roots in the training of the US military.) School ethos, in turn, is said to transmit implicitly certain values. So there is a conceptual overlap between school ethos and the hidden curriculum. But, for critical theorists, the central question would be: what is the relationship between the school ethos and that broader societal ethos to which Eisner refers? The school ethos is not free-standing; it is set within the limits of a much broader cultural, economic, political and intellectual climate. A recent American study sheds light on this issue. 'The crisis of education is a crisis in the school itself, and that crisis is a crisis of society. [...] The education crisis is first and foremost a crisis of *public life*' (Wexler *et al.* 1992, p. 155; emphasis in original). Referring to Durkheim's call for schools to be society's agencies of socialisation, Wexler's ethnographic study graphically shows that the opposite is occurring. What he finds in these schools is *desocialisation*, of 'society in reverse', of the 'elementary forms of social destruction' (p. 110). This process varies according to the socio-economic milieu of the school catchment areas. That is to say, in one of the schools, a working class high school, a well-intentioned principal sought to re-assert a work ethic, thereby reversing the permissiveness of previous decades. He was aided by a compensatory education programme called HELP, but it was poorly funded and necessitated highly bureaucratised management. The students' prevailing opinion was: 'nobody cares':

'Nobody cares' is not only the result of cutbacks, inadequate professionalism and over rationalized administrative regulation on the teachers' side, and family neglect, mass media, poverty, materialism and general cultural 'backslide' on the students' side. The mutual noncaring — which comes from different sources on each side of the failed pedagogic relation — is a *closed feedback loop* (Wexler, 1992, p. 35; emphasis added).

Here was a school whose milieu was set apart from the culture of consumption. It was literally impoverished, relatively speaking, languishing as something of a 'sink' school. True, there was the HELP programme, but it could never compensate, and was never intended to. Its teachers and its pupils bore the brunt of the market's rough justice: 'nobody cares'. It was a world apart.

Take another school studied by Wexler. This was a middle class high school constantly pushing to increase its examination results. The pupils were pressured to do well, and they did. But here competitive individualism superseded collective rituals. There was, as Wexler puts it, 'an absence of a social center' (p. 65). The staff were highly 'departmentalized'. Things became so bad that external

management consultants were brought in to enable communication, but it didn't happen. In a telling phrase, Wexler calls it 'school without society'. In sum, the first school was adrift from consumer society; the second was very much part of it, but within itself was socially fragmented. In other words, the forms of social solidarity were mediated by the social locations of the schools themselves: the working class area was virtually excluded from both production and consumption, but — ethnic rivalries aside — there was nevertheless a sense of belonging in the face of this adversity; the middle class school was very much part of consumer culture, but it lacked inner coherence and a sense of community within it.

Although Wexler's studies are not generalizable, they provoke concern, for they see the school ethos as embedded in the broader social class culture of late capitalism. The over-rationalised pedagogical relationships, the constant surveillance required for performance-related funding, contract superseding trust, league-tables of people and places, the demise of social activities in schools, the effective over the affective, the pragmatic over the principled: all of these constituted the demoralisation of the school, and the trend seems to be for more of it, for such is the logic of the market and the 'culture' which it spawns. Formal courses on values education may be no more effective than the management consultants in one of Wexler's schools. What counts as values education in an inner-city school might be entirely inappropriate in a prosperous middle class school.

THE VALUE OF CONSUMPTION

Market forces continually unsituate us, requiring us to confront ourselves — to be reflexive — before we can proceed to choose anew whatever cultural product will reveal ourselves to the gaze of others. But even the very process of reflecting and choosing can itself become a cultural product: therapists, designers, facilitators, colour-consultants are all ready to take the strain for us, for a fee. If in the past the Protestant ethic — or what Parsons once called the 'central value system' — was to be inculcated, now it is the consumer 'ethic' which is at the heart of the matter. In a sense, this consumer ethic is no less central today than the producer ethic was before 1970. Schools have recognised this. For example, learner-centred pedagogy contains little which is at odds with 'needs'-related consumerism, and it is gradually insinuating itself into every level of education. In it, there is something for everyone: its 'classroom management' regime is at one with 'empowered', flexible post-Fordist work processes, thereby helping to reproduce the social relations of capitalism, which is to the liking of business; but even for capitalism's critics these pedagogies are critical (because they are reflective), and whilst for the moment they urge self-criticism this could be a way-station to the structural criticisms of contemporary capitalism.

The logic of consumer capitalism generates plurality and ephemerality. Paradoxically, the absence of a value-consensus seems to be its value position. Paradoxically, too, what seems to be binding us together socially now is a consumerism through which we reveal our differences. All the same, however much we may differ, beneath the bought identities there remains a commitment to the value of consumption. That may be the nature of the social beneath our individualism. The products may change, but the commitment to reflection, selection and consumption persists. There is, however, a very important caveat, and it relates to the earlier reference to Wexler's study. Following Giddens, it was stated that contemporary society is typified by reflexivity, an inward gaze. Let Lash state the problem:

Are there in fact alongside the aforementioned 'reflexivity winners' whole battalions of 'reflexivity losers' in today's increasingly class-polarized, though decreasingly class-conscious, information societies? Further outside

of the sphere of immediate production, just how 'reflexive' is it possible for a single mother in an urban ghetto to be? (Lash, 1994, p. 120, emphasis in original)

Today the accumulation of capital turns more on the accumulation of information, less on the manufacture of industrial products. It is the new middle class who have access to information, both as producers of it and as consumers of it. Theirs is a new code, and the underclass born of the old working class cannot buy into it. Trust in society is lacking not so much among the consumers; rather, it is lacking between those who cannot consume and those who can. Following Wexler, I have argued that for different reasons our sense of the social is being undermined, depending upon our socio-economic condition. For the poor and the dispossessed, they cannot be part of the culture of consumption. They cannot afford it. For them, the information society, or the learning society, is a myth. Consider some figures for Scotland. In 1995, the Council of Europe Decency Threshold for pay was set at a gross weekly income of £228.68, or £6.03 per hour, slightly higher than the Scottish Low Pay Unit's corresponding amounts of £2115.47, or £5.68. On the Low Pay Unit's criteria, 42.6 per cent of all Scottish workers were low paid, women more so than men (Long *et al.*, 1996, p. 35). Nearly 20 per cent of school-aged children are entitled to free meals in Scotland; *in Glasgow it is 41 per cent* (p. 17). In the first quarter of 1995, the poorest ten per cent spent a little under two pounds per week on the National Lottery, which represented 30 per cent of their leisure spending. For the richest ten per cent, who spent nearly four pounds, it represented a mere four per cent of their leisure expenditure (p. 28). Nevertheless, contentment seems also to elude the new middle classes. 'Consumed' by individualism, making and taking information, their sense of belonging is also weak. Whereas the dispossessed may feel a sense of togetherness in their adversity, the 'haves' may feel a sense of isolation within their own lives. Both face uncertainty: for the poor it is their very survival which is at risk; for the well-to-do it is their identity as persons.

CONCLUSION

Economic neo-liberals have enabled the writ of the market to run in education. But only up to a point. In particular, funding formulae and curriculum are increasingly the preserve of the state. Consumer choice extends mainly to structures, not to content. Whilst the government attempts to frame national culture within its legislation and curricular guidelines, the market seeks to break it apart. Schools are caught in the middle, faced on the one hand by the relativism of consumer culture, and on the other by the bureaucratic fix of government. In order to re-assert a firm foundation, appeals to the old certainties are now being voiced by both the 'left' and the traditional Tory right. The former call for social justice for those who have been cast aside as both producers and as consumers; the latter see the erosion of their hallowed institutions and power. Only the marketeers profit from the confusion.

The values education movement has been given impetus by those who lament the loss of traditional values. The debate has been framed to a large extent within moral philosophy, and has so far made very little engagement with the logic of consumer capitalism. Like it or not, the 'value' of consumption constitutes part of the deep structure — of the 'ethos', to recall Eisner — of contemporary society. Within society, however, is a large segment of adults and their children who have been made marginal to the wage economy. Values education of the type now being called for by the government quangos may be seen as irrelevant to the cultural codes of both the haves *and* the have-nots. Logically, values education must surely include an understanding of the culture of consumption.

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